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Explaining the Increase
in Remittances to Mexico
By Jesus Cañas, Roberto Coronado and Pia M. Orrenius
Over the last decade 
or so, inflation-adjusted 
remittances have grown 
at an average annual rate 
of 15.6 percent. Since 2000, 
the rate has risen to 
20.4 percent.
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Remittances Rank Third in Foreign-Exchange Earnings for Mexico
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Mexicans living in the United States 
sent a record $23.1 billion back home in 
2006, putting remittances third after oil and 
maquiladora exports as a foreign-exchange 
generator for Mexico (Chart 1). Over the 
last decade or so, inflation-adjusted remit-
tances have grown at an average annual 
rate of 15.6 percent. Since 2000, the rate 
has risen to 20.4 percent. 
  What’s driving the rapid growth of 
remittances to Mexico? It’s a question that 
has puzzled researchers for years because 
the most likely economic forces don’t seem 
to be in play. Fundamental factors, such as 
the size of the Mexican migrant popula-
tion, their income and the strength of their 
bonds to Mexico, haven’t grown as fast as 
remittances. Other variables, such as the 
peso–dollar exchange rate and Mexican 
economic conditions, have been relatively 
stable since at least 1996.  
  What have changed are money-trans-
fer costs, which have plummeted since 
2000, and Banco de México’s measurement 
techniques. Together, these factors likely 
account for the bulk of unexplained remit-
tance growth in the last few years. 
Destinations and Origins
  For Mexico, remittances are an impor-
tant source of income and stability. In poor-
er parts of the country, such as the central 
and southern states, the additional income 
from family members in the U.S. is crucial 
to sustaining living standards and propping 
up local economies. 
  Banco de México has good data on 
where remittances go within Mexico (Table 1). 
The central–western states attract most of 
these financial flows, with Michoacán at the 
top with almost $2.5 billion, 16.1 percent 
of gross state product (GSP). Guanajuato 
follows at $2.1 billion (14.8 percent), then 
Jalisco at $2 billion (2.4 percent) and Estado SouthwestEconomy      4      FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • JULY/AUGUST 2007        
Table 1
Where Remittances Go in Mexico  
   
	 Millions	of	 Share	 Per	capita	 Share	of	GSP
Rank	 U.S.	dollars	 (percent)	 (dollars)	 (percent)
  1  Michoacán  2,472  10.7  617  16.1
  2  Guanajuato    2,055  8.9  414  14.8
  3  Jalisco   1,993  8.6  291  2.4
  4  Estado de México  1,926  8.4  135  6.3
  5  Distrito Federal  1,551  6.7  176  .7
  6  Veracruz    1,415  6.1  196  3.7
  7  Puebla   1,386  6.0  253  4.4
  8  Oaxaca   1,198  5.2  337  8.6
  9  Guerrero    1,157  5.0  367  10.3 
  10  Hidalgo    853  3.7  358  1.6 
  11  Chiapas  808  3.5  185  4.8 
  12  Zacatecas    610  2.6  441  9.1 
  13  San Luis Potosí   607  2.6  248  3.5 
  14  Morelos    528  2.3  323  4.7 
  15  Querétaro   467  2.0  287  3.2 
  16  Sinaloa    420  1.8  159  2.6 
  17  Aguascalientes    378  1.6  348  3.9 
  18  Durango    371  1.6  242  3.4 
  19  Chihuahua  369  1.6  112  .8 
  20  Tamaulipas   356  1.5  116  1.2 
  21  Nayarit    328  1.4  341  7.2 
  22  Nuevo León  286  1.2  67  .6 
  23  Tlaxcala    258  1.1  236  5.0 
  24  Baja California Norte   232  1.0  80  .7 
  25  Sonora    216  .9  89  .9 
  26  Coahuila    216  .9  85  .7 
  27  Colima   167  .7  289  3.9 
  28  Tabasco   150  .7  74  1.2 
  29  Yucatán    114  .5  61  .9 
  30  Quintana Roo   79  .3  67  .7 
  31  Campeche    63  .3  82  .5 
  32  Baja California Sur   25  .1  47  .5 
    National	total	 23,054	 100	 220	 2.7
NOTE: All data are 2006, except share of GSP, which is 2004.
SOURCES: Banco de México; Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática; authors’ calculations.
de México at $1.9 billion (6.3 percent). As 
a share of GSP, remittances are also signifi-
cant in Guerrero, Zacatecas, Oaxaca and 
Nayarit.
  In contrast, the northern Mexican bor-
der states of Baja California Norte, Sonora, 
Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Coahuila and 
Tamaulipas are among recipients with the 
fewest remittances. Together, they receive 
less than $1.7 billion, which represents only 
0.9 percent of their joint GSP.
  The border states have lower remit-
tances because they’re among the wealthi-
est Mexican states and aren’t typically the 
source of low-skilled migrants to the U.S.
     While Mexico 
tracks remittances’ 
destinations, we 
know less about 
the money’s origins 
within the United 
States. No state-level 
data track remittances 
to Mexico. Texas, as 
home to a fifth of all 
Mexican immigrants 
in the U.S., no doubt 
accounts for a large 
share of remittances. 
We get a sense of 
that by looking at 
the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s 
annual survey of 
remittances to Latin 
America, which ranks 
Texas second with 
$5.2 billion in 2006, 
up 64 percent from 
2004 levels (in nomi-
nal terms).1 California 
leads in remittances 
to Latin America with 
$13.2 billion, and 
New York is third 
with $3.7 billion. 
     The IADB sur-
vey also shows that 
47 percent of Latin 
American adult im-
migrants residing in 
Texas regularly send 
money home, com-
pared with 63 percent 
in California and 77 
percent in New York. 
These differences 
probably result from 
the composition of 
the Latino immigrant population in each 
state. In Texas, foreign-born Latinos are 
more likely to be young, unmarried workers 
from Mexico. They’re also more likely to be 
from Mexican border states and carry mon-
ey home on return visits—a form of transfer 
not recorded as remittances in the survey.
  In an era when more workers are 
crossing borders, Mexico’s double-digit an-
nual growth in remittances isn’t unusual. 
Looking at real remittances for a group of 
developing countries from 1994 to 2005, 
many have growth rates as high as or 
higher than Mexico’s (Chart 2). Remittances 
more than doubled in real terms over this 
period for, among others, India, the Philip-
pines, China, Bangladesh, Poland, Colom-
bia, Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican 
Republic, Nigeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka and Jamaica.2  
Driving Factors
  What determines how much money 
Mexicans send home? Overall, remittances 
tend to increase when the migrant popula-
tion rises, its income grows, the peso–dollar 
exchange rate rises, money-transfer costs 
fall or economic crisis strikes the home 
country. As migrants spend more time away 
from home, their remittances decline, par-
ticularly if migrants bring their families to 
live with them or they form new families in 
the host country.   
  These factors have contributed to the 
rise in remittances since 2000, but even col-
lectively they haven’t been dynamic enough 
to account for the entire increase. 
  Real remittances grew 170 percent 
from 2000 to 2005, but in the U.S., the 
Mexican-born population grew only 20 per-
cent. Estimates indicate Mexican immigra-
tion—legal and illegal—actually declined in 
2001, 2002 and 2003 as the U.S. economy 
entered a recession, followed by a rather 
weak labor market recovery.3 In-migration 
in 2004 was still well below 2000 levels.
  Meanwhile, real median weekly earn-
ings among U.S. Hispanics rose only 18 
percent over this period, and the dollar 
appreciated only 7.4 percent vis-à-vis the 
peso. The modest change in currency value 
reflects the Mexican economy’s relative 
stability, with its most recent crisis over a 
decade ago.
  Among the remittance drivers, the big-
gest change came in the average transaction 
cost of money transfers, which has fallen 
more than 50 percent since 2000.4 
  One factor has been greater competi-
tion. More than 100 money-transfer organi-
zations served Mexico in 2005, compared 
with only five in 1995.5 
  Another factor in cutting costs has 
been technology, including debit and credit 
cards and such transfer options as the 
Federal Reserve System’s Directo a México 
automated clearinghouse system. Banco de 
México estimates that electronic transfers 
have risen from 53 percent of remittances in 
1996 to 85.8 percent in 2003 and 93 percent 
by 2006.6 
  Spurred by declining costs for both 
senders and receivers, migrants increasingly 
have been transmitting remittances through FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • JULY/AUGUST 2007    5    SouthwestEconomy
Chart 2
Remittances Rising for Many Countries
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formal channels rather than informal chan-
nels, such as carrying cash back home. Less 
return migration and increased difficulties 
crossing the border have also contributed to 
the growing use of formal channels.7
Measuring Remittances
  Formal money transfers are easier to 
keep tabs on, and some of the displace-
ment of informal remittances has been 
counted as increases in overall transfers. In 
this way, better measurement has contrib-
uted significantly to the higher remittance 
growth rate in recent years. 
  Banco de México overhauled its pro-
cedures for collecting and recording remit-
tance data in 2000. Efforts initially focused 
on recordkeeping within the central bank 
and then on collection from sources out-
side the bank.8 In October 2002, Banco de 
México issued rules under which all banks 
and wire-transfer companies had to register 
with the central bank and report monthly 
remittances by Mexican state of destination. 
  Before 2002, monthly remittance lev-
els were inferred from an outdated 1990 
census of financial institutions, money ex-
change houses and electronic wire-transfer 
companies. The new census of companies, 
mandatory reporting and growing formal 
transfers all led to faster remittance growth. 
  The result was much improved data 
collection and a clear break with past 
trends. Setting aside the 2000–02 transition 
period, the remittance growth rate appears 
to have roughly two phases that correspond 
to Banco de México measurement chang-
es—pre-2000 and post-2002 (Chart 3). Re-
mittances’ annual average growth rate was 
10.3 percent in the first period. It rose to 
20.6 percent in the second period, although 
recent months have seen a slight decline 
(see box titled “A Slowdown in 2007” ).9  
  The data also show greater seasonality 
in 2002–06.
  Even with the new and improved mea-
surement techniques, counting informal 
remittances remains a challenge. Banco 
de México addresses the underreporting 
of informal transfers by conducting annual 
surveys of returning migrants and incorpo-
rating estimates of the cash and goods they 
carry home. However, it’s unlikely they’ve 
been able to capture such informal transfers 
with the same precision as the formal ones.
  A consequence of the new methodol-
ogy is a growing discrepancy with other 
sources of data on Mexican remittances. As 
calculated by Banco de México, remittance 
volume and growth are much higher than 
other measures, including one from the 
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The BEA estimates that 
remittances to Mexico were $10.7 billion in 
2005 and $11.1 billion in 2006. These esti-
mates are roughly half those of Banco de 
México (Chart 4). 
  The two series track closely until 2000, 
diverging around the time that Banco de 
México adopted its new measurement 
methodology. The BEA and Banco de 
México, however, have always had very 
different remittance estimation techniques. 
The BEA methodology isn’t based on direct 
reporting by banks and other fund trans-
fer companies but on a remittance model 
built on informed assumptions regarding 
migrant remittance behavior and estimates 
of the size and characteristics of the migrant 
population.10
  In addition to government, or macro, 
measures of remittances, there are survey-
based, or micro, measures of remittances 
Chart 3
Measured Remittances Climb Faster Since 2000
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Chart 4
U.S., Mexico Remittance Data Diverge After 2002
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for senders and receivers. 
  According to a household survey of 
Mexican migrants called the Mexican Migra-
tion Project (MMP), 79 percent of Mexican 
workers in the U.S. remit an average of 
$350 per month.11 If MMP migrants were 
representative of all Mexican workers in the 
U.S., these numbers would be consistent 
with official remittances of over $20 billion. 
However, MMP is overwhelmingly made up 
of return migrants who, because of their 
strong ties to the homeland, remit greater 
sums with higher frequency than average 
Mexican immigrants.  
  Recipient-based micro data on remit-
tances also differ from the Banco de México 
estimates. Looking at a large, nationally 
representative household survey in Mexico 
called Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gas-
tos de los Hogares, Gerardo Esquivel and 
Alejandra Huerta-Pineda find that 1.4 mil-
lion Mexican households received an aver-
age of $2,560 in remittances in 2002. Based 
on these figures, remittances totaled $3.6 
billion in 2002, only 37 percent of official 
estimates for that year.12 
  Some Mexican officials have ques-
tioned the discrepancy between the mac-
ro and micro data. They claim the Banco 
de México methodology, designed to 
capture familial transfers (remesas famili-
ares), doesn’t do enough to exclude trans-
actions made for illicit business reasons, 
such as payments to human smugglers or 
drug traffickers, or legitimate nonfamily 
transfers, such as donations to nonprofit 
organizations.13 
  Anecdotal evidence suggests that illicit 
cross-border money transfers have been 
increasing over time. In response to height-
ened monitoring of wire transactions within 
the U.S., including Arizona, smugglers are 
reportedly having more of their payments 
wired to border states on the Mexican 
side.14 Nevertheless, the geographic break-
down of remittances within Mexico cor-
relates well with known migration patterns 
among the population and doesn’t show 
disproportionately large transfers to Mexi-
can border states.
Modeling Remittances
  With a host of recent changes to the 
remittance data, it might be interesting to 
know what a forecast based on the “old” 
data would have predicted for post-2002 
remittances. 
  To explore this question, we construct 
a simple model with several macroeco-
nomic variables, including U.S. and Mexican 
GDP, the peso–dollar exchange rate, the 
U.S. Consumer Price Index and maquila-
A Slowdown in 2007
  The latest Banco de México data show that 
growth in remittances has tapered off in recent 
months—although flows remain at near-record 
highs.
  After starting out strongly in 2006, month-
ly remittances peaked in October 2006 at $2.1 
billion. In the first half of 2007, real remittances 
were 1.4 percent below flows in the same period 
of 2006.  
  Explaining the sudden slowdown is dif-
ficult,  but  statistical  models  suggest  Mexican 
remittances are strongly related to overall U.S. 
economic activity. Thus, it’s likely that the slow-
down is tied to recent U.S. economic decelera-
tion, particularly in sectors such as construction 
that employ a large number of Mexican immi-
grants. 
  As the U.S. economy slows and labor de-
mand ebbs, fewer Mexicans cross the border to 
seek work. Indirect confirmation can be found in 
U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions of undocu-
mented migrants, which were down 31 percent 
in the first quarter of 2007, compared with the 
same three months of 2006. U.S. gross domes-
tic product growth was also weak in the first 
quarter, below 1 percent.  
  As the U.S. economy regains momentum, 
the flow of workers should pick up and remit-
tance growth should resume. 
dora employment.15 The model generates 
a forecast by projecting the fitted values of 
remittances as of fourth quarter 2002. 
  The model predicts that macroeconom-
ic factors would have led to remittances of 
$21.5 billion in 2006 (Chart 5). Banco de 
México reported $23.1 billion. Our model 
thus explains 93 percent of the official 
estimates in 2006. The $1.5 billion gap is 
partly due to the new methodology, which 
increased the growth rate of remittances by 
incorporating newer, fast-growing firms into 
the recordkeeping, and to falling transfer 
costs, which compelled remitters to switch 
from carrying cash and goods to sending 
formal transfers.
  Adding control variables to capture the 
effect of the post-2002 change suggests the 
new methodology’s impact amounted at 
most to $700 million in 2006.16 Estimates of 
the cost elasticity of remittances show that 
cheaper transactions likely boosted 2006 
transfers by more than $1 billion.17
  Our analysis suggests better measure-
ment and falling transfer costs are important 
factors in recent increases in remittances 
to Mexico and their faster growth rate in 
the post-2000 period. Formal transfers are 
now being measured more accurately, and 
informal transfers are shrinking as remitters 
make greater use of formal channels. 
Policy Implications
  Remittance data worldwide have his-
torically been of poor quality and grossly 
underestimated migrant transfers for years. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS • JULY/AUGUST 2007    7    SouthwestEconomy
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As we have seen, the Mexican government 
has taken important steps to address these 
issues. The benefits of remittances are pro-
found. Studies have shown that migrants’ 
transfers home reduce poverty, increase 
investment in children’s schooling, boost 
health spending, finance small businesses 
and increase access to financial services.18
  A global effort to standardize the defi-
nition and measurement of remittances is 
currently under way, led by a group of mul-
tinational institutions, including the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
Better data will facilitate cross-country com-
parisons of remittances.
  Efforts to improve data come at a 
crucial time. As the monies have grown, 
policymakers have taken greater interest in 
remittances and their effects. 
  In host countries, governments are 
struggling with how to block money flows 
to terrorist groups or other criminals while 
permitting legitimate transfers. Other policy-
makers have decried remittances, suggest-
ing they be discouraged through taxation 
and senders be subject to more stringent 
identification and reporting requirements.
  In recipient countries, remittances 
have been tapped to fund public projects, 
normally paid for by resident taxpayers, 
and governments have struggled to regulate 
growth in financial service institutions that 
typically disburse transfers. As measurement 
and standardization issues get resolved, the 
policy issues will dominate future debates 
over the money migrants send home. 
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of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Orrenius 
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Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
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